

Le péché des anges

23-4

October 9, 1941.

Very Reverend Father L. O. Wolf,
Saint Paul Seminary,
Saint Paul, Minnesota.

Dear Father Wolf,

Just a few words to thank you for the kindness you have shown me during my visit to St. Paul. I shall not forget the afternoon spent together in your office, and I sincerely hope it will not have been our last meeting.

I want to take advantage of this occasion to confirm an opinion which I enunciated in answer to a question put to me by one of the seminarians after the exposé of the subject I had chosen. He asked me, you'll remember, whether the salvation of fallen angels was in any way possible. Something I had said implied some possibility of this. The student referred to St. Thomas' doctrine on the question, in which he was quite right. (Summa Theologica, Ia pars, q. 64, a. 2). I maintained nevertheless that this doctrine of St. Thomas which concerns the "potentia ordinaria", and "ordinata", does not exclude the possibility "de potentia absoluta". Because I do not want to give the impression of holding an original or exceptional opinion on this question, I am enclosing a few references.

With my best wishes and hope to entertain you some day in the near future right here in Quebec, I beg to remain,

Yours sincerely,

Saint Thomas, QQ. Disp. De Malo, q. 16, a. 5:

"Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod movere voluntatem solus Deus potest, qui etiam secundum absolutam potentiam posset mutare voluntatem daemonis in bonum; sed tamen hoc non congruit naturae ipsius, ut dictum est; ... "

John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, In Iam, Q. 64, Disp. 24, a. 2; n. 11 (Edit. Vivès, T. IV, p. 990):

"Secundo adverte quod haec inflexibilitas in angelo non dicitur ex natura ipsa sic convenire quod nec de potentia absoluta tolli possit a Deo, et converti voluntas angeli ad oppositum ejus quod semel voluit; hoc enim nullo modo dici potest in Sententia Divi Thomae qui expresse fatetur posse Deum mutare voluntatem angeli peccantis in bonum; dicit enim sic in Q. 16, a. 5, ad 13, ... Quare inflexibilitas ista in angelo solum intelligitur secundum modum naturalem operandi ejus,"

Ibid., In Iam, Q. 26, Disp. 31, a. 3 (Edit. Solesm., T. III, p. 597).

Billuart, Summa Sancti Thomae, T. II, Tract. de Angelis, Diss. VI, paragr. II ;

"Verum communius Thomistas intelligunt S. Thomam de inflexibilitate Angelorum in malo sumpta non moraliter pro magna difficultate resistendi, sed pro vera et simplici impossibilitate, secundum tamen legem Dei ordinariam. Item et de inflexibilitate ex natura et modo connaturali agendi Angelorum."

Pietro era italiano.

Quasi tutti sono stati, proprio perché,
per questo motivo.

Quasi tutti sono stati?

Quasi tutti sono stati?

Quasi tutti sono stati?

Quasi tutti sono stati?

Acts of imitation.

{ Quick art.
Quick imitation.

Delight in imitation.

For sake of imitation. Better, in order of representation than ...
detachment of imitation. gives rise to ineffable.

Ex. of light. of the hyacinth.

Imitation of human conduct. History & poetry. Catharsis of fear & pity.
Here morality. What is moral? *Oedipus. Richard III.*

Compare orig. to imit. If ~~orig~~ imitation explains, as usual ...

How immorality is contrary to perfection of art. Relative to age-group
& education.
Censorship. He is justified. In a Catholic
society. But if this causes scandal, perhaps tolerance.
Must explain.

1. Principale objection contre exist. de Dieu, selon l'apôtre: misère, délais^t de l'homme.
 2. description du délais^t: notre condition de sujet. [ex attit. sage { mis. imal. sap. h.}]
 3. Pourtant, notre délais^t n'est le fait de la misère. del. et de la plus grande.
 - quid misér.
 - degrés: création
 élévation
 chute et rédempt. { immed.
 union hypost.
 naisance
 malum poenae.
 4. la raison suffr. de l'homme s'incarne et "quam me deulgetur".
 - Dieu devient homme.
 - un parmi plusieurs
 - jeune, fort, jeune homme.
 - sensible: allemand.
- Incompréhensible.

La Maternité divine et l'Assomption de la Vierge de Dieu.

Voici un résumé de l'argument auquel le conférencier s'est arrêté: "Depuis le commencement, l'Eglise invoque et honore Marie comme Mère de Dieu. Or, le corps est essentiel à l'être de la mère envisagée formellement comme mère. Si donc Marie était seulement une âme séparée, elle ne serait plus, à présent, Mère de Dieu, de son Fils ressuscité, que par référence à un état d'union de l'âme et du corps, qui serait maintenant du passé. En sorte qu'à parler en toute rigueur, on ne pourrait pas dire que Marie, ^{qui ex} ~~est~~ Mère de Dieu, ^{existe présentement comme Mère;} astrictement, on devrait entendre ^{qu'elle était la Mère de Dieu, mais qu'elle n'est pas maintenant} ~~qu'elle était la Mère de Dieu~~. ^{On ne pourrait dire de la Mère de Dieu qu'elle est seulement après} ~~elle ne serait établie dans sa vraie maternité qu'à la résurrection des morts à la fin des temps.~~ Il n'y aurait au ciel que "ce par quoi Elle est"; mais "Elle" ne serait pas au ciel — "Elle" ne serait pas. Son âme serait bienheureuse, mais la Vierge, la Mère de Dieu ne serait pas bienheureuse. Ainsi, l'âme de l'Apôtre saint Pierre est au ciel, mais l'Apôtre n'est pas bienheureux, puisque l'âme n'est pas l'Apôtre. Bref, la Mère de Dieu ne serait présentement, ni substance première ni substance seconde. Or, cela est manifestement contraire à la pensée et à l'intention des fidèles qui, en disant "Mère de Dieu", Mère du Christ glorieux, ne doutent pas ^{que cette Mère qui est personne} ~~qu'elle est~~ ^{existe maintenant} ~~présentement et proprement, Mère de Dieu~~; ils abhorreraient l'idée que celle qui a donné naissance au Christ maintenant ressuscité, n'est pas actuellement une personne. En effet,

comme le dit saint Thomas: "L'âme ~~comme le corps~~ n'étant
du vivant corporel qu'est
qu'une partie ~~de~~ l'homme, elle n'est pas l'homme tout entier,
et mon âme n'est pas moi; donc, bien que l'âme atteigne au
salut dans l'autre vie, ce qui atteint au salut n'est pas
'moi' ni 'un homme'. Ce serait contraire aussi à la parole
du Sauveur du haut de la croix: "Voilà votre mère". Si la
Sainte Vierge n'était qu'une âme séparée, non seulement le
Christ n'aurait pas, actuellement, de Mère, mais la maternité
spirituelle de Marie envers nous, inséparable de sa maternité
physique envers le Christ, n'aurait pas de vérité dans "

Comme le bon Dieu semble avoir compliqué les choses! Songez seulement aux
chrétiens, qui ont précédé la déclaration sol. de C. Dom. C. - Étranges sur
plusieurs siècles.

Ratio :- Cause de la vérité éternelle divine.

- nār meae, non vultum.
- pureté de la foi: Quia dicitur.
- Cause. in-f. de la mort. dit. qui est en du contp. comme du mē.
- l'existence. dirait absurde l'obscurité qui ne contourne alors que Dieu sagesse, l'existence.
- le silence de Dieu pour la Parole.
- Tous verront cela le jour où nous aurons laché les valises.
- Notre indignité en face de ces mystères. Au lieu d'être ingrats, comme.
pour tout petit point que nous pourrions avoir dans les rich. éternelles. nous devons valoir.

Assomption

Il importe de bien marquer la différence entre les deux propositions suivantes: "Marie est la Mère de Dieu" et "Marie, qui est la Mère de Dieu, existe." En effet, comme dit S. Thomas (de Ver., q.14, a.12) à propos de la Résurrection du Christ, l'acte de foi ne porte pas sur la Résurrection envisagée comme nature abstraite, — ~~il~~ ~~alors~~ ~~il~~ ~~serait~~ ~~indifférent~~ ~~se~~ ~~croire~~ que la Résurrection du Christ a eu lieu ou qu'elle aura lieu, ^{En vérité l'acte de foi doit} ~~mais~~ ~~l'acte~~ ~~porter~~ ~~sur~~ l'événement in singulari, concret, historique, mesuré par le temps. Donc, si je ne croyais pas que le Christ est ressuscité, je ne croirais pas à la Résurrection selon qu'elle est objet de foi.

^{me paraît être}
Cette distinction ~~est~~ d'une importance primordiale pour la question de l'Assomption. En effet, s'il y a eu Assomption, non seulement il est vrai de dire "Marie est Mère de Dieu", mais aussi "Marie, qui est Mère de Dieu, ^{existe} ~~est~~." Cette dernière vérité se distingue de la première, car ici j'affirme l'existence actuelle, présente, de la personne comme personne.

Si l'âme de la Sainte Vierge n'était pas actuellement unie à son corps, il serait faux de dire que la Mère de Dieu est au ciel,

ni même sur la Résurrection du Christ abstraction faite d'un temps particulier. En effet, s'il en était ainsi, il serait indifférent de croire

qu'elle est avec le Christ, qu'elle intercède pour nous. Il faudrait, pour parler en toute rigueur, s'en tenir à dire: l'âme de la ~~Sainte~~ Vierge est au ciel, l'âme de la Mère de Dieu est avec son Fils, l'âme de la Vierge intercède pour nous.

~~En effet, la personne se dit de la substance complète et non pas de ses parties. L'âme n'est pas la personne. "Anima... dum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima consequatur salutem in alia vita, non tamen ego vel quilibet homo." (In 1 Cor., c.15, v.2) Item, In Jo. in 215/~~

Dès lors, si la Ste Vierge n'était pas actuellement au ciel selon l'âme et le corps, nous ne pourrions dire de son âme rien de ce ~~qui ne peut se dire que de la personne~~. Puisque le sujet propre de ces prédicats n'existerait pas, ~~nous ne pourrions attribuer~~ ces prédicats ^{ne pourraient s'attribuer} qu'à un sujet ~~en~~ quelque manière fictif.

P Par exemple, si on attribuait la maternité au sujet réellement existant, et si ce sujet n'était qu'une âme séparée, la vérification de la proposition exigerait une référence à la substance composée qui était, mais qui n'est pas absolument. C'est grâce à une dénomination

In de An. II, n. 215.

extrinsèque que l'âme tient lieu du sujet propre
d'une telle attribution - c'est-à-dire ^{de} la substance
composée qui n'est plus. L'intelligence doit user
de mémoire et se rendre présent d'une manière pure-
ment intentionnelle un sujet qui, formellement, n'a
qu'une existence d'objet. Entitativement il n'y
aurait que l'âme. ~~En effet~~ Elle serait ^{en effet} le seul
sujet ^{dont on peut dire qu'il y a} existant. Or, ce sujet ne peut, par lui-
même, recevoir de telles attributions. Voilà pour-
quoi nous parlons de fiction. Qu'on exclue la fic-
tion, et la proposition devient purement et simple-
ment fausse.

A. Perle, C. n. & B. d. d. 7 n. 7.

~~Quant à l'âme et le corps de la Vierge
n'étaient pas actuellement unis, on ne pourrait
parler ni de substance première (hic homo), ni
de substance seconde (homo), ni de vivant, ni de
ce vivant. "Anima vivit, sed non est animal, neque
vivens, neque corpus, neque substantia." "Cœur et
en effet, signifient toujours le tout."~~

Quant aux attributs propres de la Sainte
Vierge, nous ne pourrions pas dire, par exemple,
"la Mère de Dieu existe", "Notre Dame existe",
"la Reine des anges existe". ~~Vous voyez bien que
tout cela présenterait des inconvénients.~~

Il ne va pas contre le sens de l'Eglise que
saint Pierre n'existe pas actuellement, qu'Adam
n'existe pas actuellement. Mais...

*Bien qu'il serait bon de le dire
l'Eglise de ne pas invoquer la
personne des saints, (I^{re} II^e, p. 83,
a. 11, ad 5)
Non Caj. in I^{re} Perle, C. n.
p. 7, p. 103*

Cette serait pas la personne de la Sainte Vierge qui actuellement intercède pour nous.

L'âme de Marie, s'adressant au Christ pour nous, ne pourrait pas dire "Mon Fils". En effet,

l'âme de la Sainte Vierge n'est pas la Mère du

Christ. *Si on ne pouvait pas dire : la Mère du Christ existe, nous ne pourrions pas dire non plus : ~~Si elle n'était pas la Mère du Christ, elle ne serait pas non plus notre Mère.~~* *Maria nostra Mater existe.*

~~Il est pas non plus notre Mère.~~ Nous n'aurions pas de Mère au ciel. ~~Donc~~ le principe univer-

Ave Maria...

sel qui intercède pour nous ne serait pas une

personne, *mais* ~~Donc~~ un principe incomplet. *Ce principe*

aurait pas en acte la perfection vers laquelle

Aussi bien ce principe n'aurait-il

il nous conduit. La béatitude de la Sainte Vierge serait incomplète, et par conséquent son être de principe universel le serait d'autant.

Nous invoquons aussi, il est vrai, et nous honorons comme mères d'autres saintes: sainte Anne, par exemple, mère de la Vierge Marie. Toutefois, dans ces cas, nous ne supposons aucunement qu'elles aient, actuellement, l'être complet de mère envisagé comme tel. Nous entendons que sainte Anne a engendré Marie, et non pas que cette mère existe dans le présent.

Comme "Homère et poète,"

Mais dans le cas de Marie, non seulement l'Eglise a-t-elle confessé la maternité divine de la Vierge, mais le culte des fidèles s'étend jusqu'à la vie présente de la Mère de Dieu comme personne. Voilà pourquoi nous croyons bien fondé ce vœu que forment les croyants pour une confirmation solennelle de l'Assomption comme dogme de foi.

*Amère a été mariée et n'est pas
mais la Mère de Dieu
existe*

tablette spirale - 5 1/4 x 8 1/4 - pages numérotées 5 à 17- 19 - 21
3 pages non numérotées
2 pages insérées : 1 intitulée : Lex
1 intitulée: A question of words

1 feuillet
1 carte

The Tablet, nov. 44, pp. 248-249: Politics and Original Sin - A Criticism of M.
Maritain's Recent Essay by T.S. Gregory

The Tablet, oct. 45 , pp. 175-6 : "Christianity and Democracy" From M.Jacques
Maritain

p. 176 : Mr. T.S. Gregory writes

Notes sur papier de soie: 3 pages

Notes diverses: 15 pp. de notes sur 8 1/2 x 11 et autres grandeurs

Traduction de textes latins: 8 pp.

Devoir d'étudiant? 14 pages à la mine

Deux documents sur J. Maritain

Bien Commun

Racine: bonum diffusivum sui. Genus: actus sui communicativus.

Bonum diffusivum: i.e. excedens lumen contractum ad singulare. Divinum
propter universalitatem; item divinum de forma.

Personne ne se définit pas par la seule incommunicabilité, mais aussi
nature. Et nullement par liberté. Personnalisme répand notion d'homme
on ne saisissant plus rien en de l'unicité, uti personne communiquée par
personne, mais cependant principe, image, amour; uti relations, etc.
Item pour "absolu".

Esclave libre de l'ordre.

Quid bonum universale? Montre différence avec "natura universalis";
car bonum "concret" et sic est pro particulari.

Bien n'est que la soc. civile à été fondée pour les hommes, et non pour
des chiens; la soc. ne sera pas civile si elle ~~ne~~ ne reconnaît pas
que ses membres sont des personnes, et non des bêtes; bien n'est
que le bien de l'homme que la soc. civile, en visages, peut comme elle,
peut nous ^{à elle seule} procurer, n'est pas le bien commun. Et est lui-même,
dans une société qui mérite ce nom, ordonné explicitement
à Dieu. Pourquoi les personnalités n'ont-ils pas exigé
que les dirigeants de la soc. civile fassent cela? Une soc.
qui ne fait pas cela est convenue à sa racine. Ne peut-elle être
plus large d'esprit que le bon Dieu? On veut aujourd'hui au-dessus
de la corruption et la basant par elle.

Virtus superior et inferior. de Virt. et Comm., 1. 10, ad 4^m (p. 5194)
^{2^a} 2^a 2^a

Bonum proprium non oppositum ut sic communi. de Car. 2, c. (544)
privatum disting. a bono communi. de Car. 4, ad 2, (551)

Le bien est ce que toutes choses désirent. Donc il a saison de fin. Donc, il est "sec."
diffusif de soi pour mode de fin.

Le hyron désire la pos. du bien commun. V^l part en cela avec un certain orgueil,
mais il le fera en vue de s'amuser sa part de lar. 2, c. (545a)

{ Amare bonum ut possideretur. *bonum*
{ Amare bonum secundum se. *bonum*

Altor causa communior: { Pot. 3/7, c. f. "Quanto aliqua causa et alior, tanto sit comm.
et efficiens."
Met. VI, l. 3, med. " . . . "tantoque causalitas."

Quanto altior, tanto caus. extend. Ia, 65, 3, c.

Op. II, 16, 3m

Ср. III, 24, f.

add III, b, c.

"*hanc quoque causalitatem
plura ne extendit.
enim causa altior
causatum altius quo
communius et in plura
inventum.*" (n. 1205)

rien se communique à la création raisonnable. Quant à sa communicabilité n.:
i.e. le bien de la création raisonnable est divin, i.e. communicatif, diffusif
de soi.

Deja chez brutes, le bien du genre super. au lieu de l'ignorer.

ср. III

Bien commun

- Bien commun à tout les niveaux (meilleur que le bien de la personne individuelle, mais propre & t. Même dans fin ultime, bien commun).
 - On peut jouer sur la hiérarchie des biens communs.
 - Chaque pays, bien commun propre. Etic ordre de concrétion. Mais, ce bien commun demeure subordonné.
- Voir index, Didot

- Ens simpliter, bonum sec. quid.
- Les ordaines raisonn. se disting. des irais. parceque les premières ont davantage ordonnées au bien commun.
- Rapport bien commun et dignité. Hanc implique plus prof. partie au bien commun.
cf. Bergamo "dignitas".
- L'homme n'est pas digne seulement à cause de son ordination à un bien supérieur au bien de la communauté civile, il a une dignité inaliénable ^{déjà} à cause de ce bien de la comun.
(En quoi consiste la dignité? bonitas propria se. Or, hanc dupl. ex: sec. ratione ut sic - alors se spec.; sec. volunt., alors...)

Gregorius =

15. C. → E

Ita enim deus super omnia est, ut ipse sub nullo sit. Leviathan
non iste ejus celsitudinis culmen aspiciens, quo juvenae libertates
~~appetit~~ appetiit, ut et gressus cactus, et melli subdubet,
dicens: Ascendam super altitudinem nubium, et similis ero
altissimis (Isai. XIV, 14). Cuius id ipso similitudinem perdidit,
quo esse ei superbe similis in celsitudine concupivit.
Sui enim charitatem ~~ipse~~ ejus imitari ^{debet} ~~debet~~, subditus
ambit quo celsitudinem, et hoc quod imitari poterat,
amisit elatus. Celsus nimirum esset, si ei qui novaciter
~~est~~ celsus est, inhaerere voluisset. Celsus esset, si
participatione vere celsitudinis contentus fuisset, sed dum
privatam celsitudinem superbe appetiit, jure perdidit
participationem. Relicto enim eo cui debuit inhaerere coniugio,
suum sibi appetiit ~~probum~~ quodammodo in coniugio. Relicto
eo qui vere illi sufficere poterat, se sibi sufficere jure
perdidit; et tanto magis ex se ~~et~~ cecidit, quanto magis
se contra gloriam sui conditoris erexit. Nam quem habebat
libera servitus, ~~exiit~~ deiecit captiva libertas.

Sancti Gregorii Magni Moralius Lib. XXXIV. ~~(176)~~; Caput XXI.
~~175~~ B. Col. 740, 1134 B.
~~(176)~~.

(1849)

Patrologiae Auresis Completus. - J. P. Migne.
Series Prima.

Patrologiae Tomus LXXVI ~~(175)~~ (176)

Sancti Gregorii Papae I, Tomus ~~1~~ secundus.

Moralius Libri, Lib. XXXIV,
— — — — —

*Infirmiores sunt, inquit, inferiorisque nature; non decet eos
concinere, nec agnoscere in gloria.*

*Serius Secunda, Patologicae Tomus CLXXXIII. (183.) - S. Bernardus
abbas Clarae - Vallensis. Volume Secundum, Tomus IV.*

(1854.)

Sermones in Cantica, sermo XVII. col. 857, 1219C.

1

The position according to which the good of the singular person is superior to the good of the community becomes abominable when one considers that the pers. is itself the main object of one's singular good... can amor etc...."

18. - In other words, the highest good of man to which he pertains to him, not insofar as he is in himself a certain whole in which he is himself the principal object of his love, but insofar as he is a part of a whole, "in quantum ad pars aliequius totius", a whole which is accessible to him because of the universality of his knowledge. You might say that the nature of a part does not belong to man considered ~~to~~ in relation to his ultimate end? Here is the immediate continuation of the text which we have just quoted: "Et hoc modo caritas etc..." It is therefore as a part of a whole that we are ordered to the greatest of all goods, which can be most ours, only in its communicability to others. If the divine good were formally "quoddam bonum proprium hominis in quantum ad singularem personam", we ourselves would be the measure of this good, which is very properly an abomination. -

Even the love of one's proper good
must not be withdrawn from the love
of the common good. We have in effect
so thoroughly, the nature of a part, that
the rectification with respect to the proper
good can be true only in so far as it is
in conformity with and subordinate to
the common good. "Unitas agitantes partes"
(18 b). This ordination is so complete that those
who ~~seek~~ the common, seek their proper
good ex consequenti. "Primum finem..."; (19)
And this is most manifest in that common
good which is beatitude, where the very
universality of the good is the principal
of the beatitude for the singular person.
Now it is because of its very universality
that this good may beatify this singular
person. And this participation in the
sovereign common good is the ~~from~~
basis of communication between the
singular person extra verbum. Though
one might concede that the singular persons
are ordered to the ultimate separate good under
the formality of common good, one might not
admit so readily that within the universe
even the persons are meant only for the good
of the order of the universe, ~~the common~~
an intrinsic common good which is better

than the singular persons who materially
constitute the universe. In this opinion
the order of the universe would merely be
a superstructure of persons, of persons
whom God wills, not as parts, but as
radically independent wholes; and it
would be only secondarily that these
wholes are parts. And the reason would
be, that rational creatures differ from
irrational creatures in that they are
meant and formed for themselves,
not only ~~according~~ ^{as} to the species but also as
to the individual. "Actus, ..." (20).

Therefore, ^{one} might conclude, the individual
persons are themselves gods meant first for
~~themselves~~ themselves and in themselves superior
to the good of the accidental whole which
they constitute by way of consequence
and of completion.

Now, why does God will the distinction
of things, their inequality and their order?
"Pistulas rerum..." (21-23).

Quite naturally we will revolt against
this conception if we consider the singular
person at the first root, ~~and~~ as the ultimate
intrinsic end, and consequently as the
measure of all ~~extrinsic~~ ^{intrinsic} good intrinsic to
the universe. We will revolt against the very
idea of order, whereas in truth, a creature

is perfect only to the extent that it participates in the order. The separate substances are more perfect than we because they are more ordered and because by their very nature they participate more profoundly in the perfection of the universe of which they assume whose splendour they assume because of this very ordination. "Quae a Deo..."

Ans. Could the angels love their inequality if this inequality were not rooted in the common good, and if this common good were not their greater good? If, on the contrary, the very being of their person were to them the greatest good intrinsic to the universe, their inequality would be a principal of discord, among the angels themselves as well as between each individual person and the Community; their inequality would proceed, not from divine wisdom, but, either from the contrariety of good and evil and from freedom, or from a primacy ^{conceded} ~~conceded~~ to the material distinction.

The fact that the principal parts which materially constitute the universe are ordered and governed for themselves manifest all the more the excellent perfection of the ensemble which is the first intrinsic reason of the perfection of the parts "per hoc autem..." (26).

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In these words, when we say that the rational
creatures are ordered and governed for themselves,
we do not mean thereby that they are ordered to
themselves and to the proper end of their personal
nature; we mean thereby that they themselves
can explicitly attain the good to which all
things are ordered. And this good is primarily
the Common good. It is in this that they
differ from the irrational creatures who are
pure instruments and who do not
themselves attain explicitly the universal
good to which they are ordered.

Objections and answers.

It seems that the dignity of the person is
opposed to the nature of part and to this
ordination to the Common good. For, "dignitas."
Furthermore, "dignitas est de absolute dicta..." 68.
Is it not for this reason that the persons are
ordered to and governed for themselves?
To this we answer that the rational creature
has its dignity in that, by its own operation,
by its intelligence and by its love, can attain
the ultimate end of the universe. "Præcellentia."

Far from excluding the ordination of the
private good to the Common good, the dignity
of the person entails the necessity of ordering
its private good to the superior good, and

its action would be contrary to this dignity if it did not accomplish this ordination. "Sicut enim..." (31). The person ~~would shift~~ then be the more worthy ~~inasmuch~~ ^{insofar} as it orders its ~~own~~ proper good to a more remote good and in no way because its proper good would leave the nature of an ultimate end. And there will therefore be degrees of dignity, either because of a greater ~~inborn~~ ^{acquired} capacity for the common good, or because of a free ordination to the good, in which ordination the dignity is accomplished. From this it can be seen the extent to which will beate the rational creature when we place its greatest dignity in the end proper to its individual nature, ^(superior) from which we would have to conclude that the end of the person consists in the sub-bodding of ~~their~~ ^{their} personality.

Because "dignitas est de absolute dictis" it cannot be a proper attribute of the person as such, but rather of the nature of the person. For, the person is not so much an absolute. The divine Persons are subsistent relations. "Pateritas igitur..." (32) ~~similar in like manner~~. Similarly, in man, dignity is not an attribute of the person considered as such, but rather an attribute

of rational nature. So that if the created person is an absolute, it is because of the very imperfection in the nature of person.

~~Furthermore~~ And even when we say that the rational nature is an absolute, this absolute remains relative, as in the case of the transcendental relation (secundum se). In other words, the dignity is inseparable from the relation of this rational nature to the end. ~~of the universe~~

And when we say that rational nature is itself the end of all irrational nature, we must not forget that this very being end and with respect to what is inferior, is constituted by the ordination to a higher good. Furthermore, in the purely created rational nature, the nature itself subordinates to itself the personality. We must not forget that the person itself is universally defined by communicability: "rationalis naturae individua substantia". In this definition "natural" stands for "principle of operation". The incommunicability of the person itself is not a term, but on the contrary, far from being a "propter se" in this incommunicability, the very incommunicability

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opens ~~that~~ the nature to communication.
"Actions must support reason". The
divine persons are essentially expressive of
the plurality of the divine nature. In
the case of the created person, the communi-
cation is accomplished through the vital
participation in the common good.

both by the common citizen and by the ruling citizen, each in the manner appropriate to his condition. The common good of society ~~itself~~ demands ~~the~~ ~~itself~~ this ordination. Without this explicit and open ordination, political society inevitably degenerates into a free state

It is said that the good of an accidental whole is inferior to the good of a substantial whole. Now, the community is an accidental being, and is one by accident only. Therefore, the common good must be subordinate to the good of the person. This difficulty supposes that we hold a perfectly false conception of the common good. This good does not formally regard society as it is an accidental whole; it is the good of the substantial wholes which are members of ~~society~~ the community. The objection presupposes a principle common to the persons, ~~the~~ ^{belonging} ~~the~~ ^{two} society divides the person against itself, and gives rise to a tension between the two. If, on the other hand, we consider the common good intrinsic to society as an accidental form, it does not follow therefrom that it is inferior to that which is substantial. We are speaking of the good. Now, the division of the good is not that of being. "P~~er~~ se commun..." (35). ~~On the other hand~~ Furthermore, if, in order to determine the superiority of a good, we base ourselves upon its union with us

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according to the substance considered
absolutely, we would have to conclude
that all things love themselves above all
other things, and that the love of the
singular good is the measure of the
common good. This would suppose that
the created persons are primarily wholes,
absolutely, and that their being a part
is secondary. But this is entirely false.
We are first and mainly parts of the
universe. It is for this reason that we
naturally love the whole more than the
part. "Nunquidne..." (36). Because
the human person, "secundum hoc
ipsum quod est, alterius est", it is
radically dependant, it is radically
part, primo et per se. And, consequently
"principalis et magis inclinatur hoc
ipsum quod est in id cuius est, quam
in seipsum". It is this principle, known
first in nature and in the political
virtues which imitate nature, ~~that will~~
~~be the~~ upon which will rest the conclusion
that, according to natural love, we
love God more than ourselves. "Natura
et substantia..." (36 b).

If this were not so, natural love would be perverse. And, on the political level, for instance, the sacrifice of the individual person for the common good would have its principle and its term in the love of self of the individual man as man, even the intentions of natural justice would be selfish. All love would be restricted to the particular. The common good would be lovable only insofar as it would be reducible to ~~a part of~~ the state of a particular good.⁽³⁸⁾ The love of the common good would be identified with the love of our fellow citizens, for instance qua another particular. In this sacrifice of the common good we would indeed be inferior to the brutes. Charity would not perfect natural love, it would be contrary to it and destroy it.

Another objection would be: "Bonum gratiale minus magis est quam bonum naturale totius universi" (41). — But it should be noted that St. Th. does not oppose the good of grace to the singular person to the good of grace of the community, but

of the ~~universe~~ ^{superiorly} ~~universe~~
he opposes the good of grace, to the ^{superiorly} natural
good of the universe. And, if the spiritual
good of the person is ~~superior~~ to be preferred
to all created common good, and if, accor-
ding to this spiritual good, the person
must love itself more, it does not
follow therefrom that the created
common good is, as such, subordinated
to the singular person. The spiritual
good of man has an essential relation
to the separate common good, and
on this level, man is more a part
than in any other respect. The supernatural
good of the singular person is so thoroughly
ordered to the supernatural common
good, that we cannot distinguish
between the supernatural virtue of
man and the supernatural virtue
of man as a part of the "Celestis
Jerusalem".

Again it might be said that no
society is ~~in the same~~ properly in the
image of God; therefore, the singular
person is purely and simply superior
to society. — Just as the preceding
objections this one also supposes a false

Conception of society itself. Now, society is not an entity separable from its members: it is constituted of persons who are in the image of God. ~~But~~ It is this society, and not a general abstract entity, it is this society constituted of persons, which is the principal intention of God in the universe. That its members are in the image of God is a sign of the perfection of their ensemble. Why has God made them many and ordered? Does not divine goodness show itself better in a multitude and an order of rational creatures than in one singular person as such? Is not truth more fully communicated in the contemplative life of the community than in the contemplative life of the singular person? Does not beatitude itself have the ~~private~~ nature of a communion principle? Does the incommunicability of person in the act of vision break down the universality of the object? And the love which this object gives rise to, does it attain the